Double statelessness: the Sahrawi people’s situation

The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a non-recognized state. This, in turn, means that the Sahrawis are state­less. A visit to LEFRIG, a Sahrawi Collective Youth Association in Spain, helps to foster a deeper under­standing of state­less­ness.

Noemi TruccoNovember 19, 2026

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LEFRIG’s premises in Zaragoza, July 2026© Noemi Trucco

There are ten or more tables arranged in the room, and at almost every one of them sit staff and clients. The two men at the table next to me have a bottle of water and a plastic plate with pieces of chocolate in front of them, while the woman opposite them is typing some­thing into a form on a computer. «We also store their papers, so they do not get stolen or lost because many of our clients do not have a home», Dadah, a young team member at LEFRIG, a Sahrawi Collective Youth Association in Zaragoza, Spain, explains to me. Dadah then points at a young woman and two men across the room: «Aminetou is helping them with the state­less recognition process», he tells me. It is July and almost forty degrees in Zaragoza, when I visit LEFRIG. I am here as a sociologist researching state­less­ness.

LEFRIG approached me in November 2025 when they learnt by word of mouth that I was interested in stateless-led organi­sations. The youth collective was founded in Zaragoza in 2012 and aims at ensuring access to essential services for vulner­able people, such as undocu­mented migrant youth. One of its main objectives, however, is to support and advise the Sahrawi people to mitigate the inequal­ities caused by their status. The association works both in Spain and in the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria, where around 180’000 Sahrawis live. Their work also involves raising awareness about their situation and is strongly guided by feminist, decolonial, anti-racist and anti-ableist values.

Statelessness is a little-known and largely over­looked form of social exclusion found all over the world. State­less people are, according to the United Nations’ 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of State­less Persons, «not considered as a national by any state under the operation of law». Stateless people do not exist in legal terms, because they either do not possess identity docu­ments or their docu­ments are not recognized inter­nationally. This has a profound impact on those affected, making it difficult to meet basic needs such as education, health care, or employ­ment. Contrary to the common assumption that all non-citizens are migrants, most stateless people world­wide live in the country in which they were born.

The main cause for state­less­ness is structural. Under inter­national law, each state has the right to determine who is a citizen and who is not, and the inter­national community does not interfere in this matter. At the same time, Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises nationality1 as a fundamental human right. This creates a paradox: while states decide who belongs and who does not, there is no entity that has the power to enforce compliance with human rights. State­less­ness is therefore an ongoing conse­quence of an imperfect global system, even though it is still often presented as a «legal anomaly». But how is state­less­ness actually produced in practice?

Statelessness in the MENA region

If we take the MENA region as an example, there are various factors contributing to state­less­ness. First, a lack of birth regis­tration can lead to state­less­ness. If a child is not registered at birth, it does legally not exist and is thus stateless. This can occur for various reasons, including limited access to registry offices and the collapse of bureau­cratic processes in the context of war or conflict.

Statelessness can also be the result of gender discriminating nationality laws. Four­teen countries in the region, among them Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, do not allow mothers to pass on their citizen­ship to their children. Children are thus left state­less, if the father is a foreigner, has himself a complex legal status or is unknown or missing.

This highlights the third important factor: discrimi­nation. Not only is there widespread gender discrimi­nation in the region’s nationality laws, there is also discrimi­nation in access to citizen­ship based on «ethnicity», language or religion as well as practices of nation­ality revo­cation. Very often, these forms of discrimi­nation are legitimised through a discourse which labels parts of the population as «foreign» or «illegal residents». One example is the mass denation­al­isation in Syria in 1962, which left many Kurds state­less, as legal scholar Malak Benslama-Dabdoub from Queen Mary University in London shows in a 2021 article. Another example is the exclusion of Bedouins in Kuwait (the so-called Bidoon) from nationality since the 1960s. Moreover, some states in the region, such as Bahrain, strip citizens of their nationality simply because they are part of the political opposition, even though this is prohibited under inter­national law.

Finally, another key factor contributing to state­less­ness in the region are border changes, territorial disputes and the emergence of new states – a factor that is closely linked to colonial legacies and should always be contex­tualised historically. This can be illustrated by the case of the Palestinians.2 They are the largest state­less popu­lation in the world, although their legal status is complicated, depends on their country of residence and they are often not recorded as state­less, as inter­national law experts Francesca Albanese and Lex Takkenberg show in their book (2020) on the matter. Another example is Western Sahara. And this brings us back to an early after­noon in Zaragoza and my visit to LEFRIG.

Western Sahara: a case of non-recognized statehood

The history of Western Sahara and the experiences of the Sahrawi people are no longer prominent features of public debates. Presum­ably, very few viewers of Christopher Nolan’s newest film «Odyssey» are aware of the fact that it was partly shot in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. The ethical impli­cations of such a decision seem not to have been taken into account: filming in an occupied territory means collabo­rating with an occupying power and thereby legitimising it. At the same time, Sahrawis in the occupied territory are denied the right to express them­selves freely and, for example, to document their daily lives on camera – they can be imprisoned for doing so. As geographer Joanna Allan and Sahrawi scholar Moiti Mohamed Azrouk (2025, p. 11) write: «While the human rights situation in occupied Western Sahara might be among the worst in the world, it is also among the least known». Even in Spain, the younger generation does not know much about Western Sahara anymore, Dadah tells me over a coffee. There is often not enough time in schools to cover recent Spanish history and the Franco era, which also involves the Sahrawi question.

Western Sahara was a Spanish colony from 1884 until 1976. The anti-colonial move­ment of the Sahrawis, the Polisario Front, was founded in 1973 and called for self-determination and the inde­pen­dence of Western Sahara. But neigh­bouring Morocco held the view that, prior to Spanish coloni­sation, Western Sahara had been part of Morocco. Although the Inter­national Court of Justice (ICJ) found that this was not the case and recom­mended self-determination for the Sahrawis, Morocco and Mauritania invaded the territory in late 1975. An armed conflict ensued, which resulted in the displace­ment of many Sahrawis to refugee camps in neigh­bouring Algeria. In 1976, Spain with­drew from the territory, while the Polisario announced the creation and inde­pen­dence of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Mauritania with­drew from the conflict in 1979, but the war between Morocco and the Polisario continued until 1991, when a peace plan was signed. Since then, however, no referendum for self-determination has taken place. Morocco has built a military wall dividing the territory and occupies two-thirds of it. These lands are rich in natural resources, notably phosphate, and are being exploited by Morocco. The eastern third is controlled by the Polisario Front, which also administers the five large refugee camps in the Algerian Tindouf region. Protests in the Moroccan-occupied part, such as the 2010 Gdeim Izik protest camp, are brutally repressed. In 2020, Donald Trump endorsed Moroccan control over Western Sahara, which led to the end of the cease­fire and the resumption of military confronta­tions. And in 2025, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution supporting autonomy for Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty. It is there­fore not surprising that Western Sahara is some­times called «Africa’s last colony».

The term «statelessness» thus has more than one meaning in the case of Western Sahara. The SADR is a full member of the African Union and has been recognised by over 70 non-Western states, however not by the inter­national community. Sahrawis lack a state – they are literally «state-less» – because their claim to state­hood is not recognized inter­nationally. But at the same time, they are often also state­less as individuals.

Sahrawi statelessness

Depending on their place of residence, the status of Sahrawis differs. As legal scholar Andrea Immanuel (2023) from Melbourne Law School shows, Morocco has a policy of automatic conferral of nationality in the occupied territory. This makes Sahrawis living in the occupied territory Moroccan nationals, a violation of their right to nation­ality since it is a nation­ality imposed on them by an occupying power. «[T]here have been resistance and protests by many Sahrawis who refuse to accept Moroccan docu­ments», she writes (Immanuel 2023, pp. 923–924). Some states, such as Switzer­land, are contributing to the perpetu­ation of this: the Swiss Secretariat of Migration (SEM) suddenly registered a man as Moroccan. He had been living in Switzer­land for 20 years and was originally registered as being from Western Sahara. When he asked for a correction, SEM stated that Switzer­land does not recognise Western Sahara and its nationals were registered as Moroccans because Morocco claims the territory. It then decided to register him as «with­out nationality», but not recognising his state­less­ness; a procedure that was upheld by the Swiss Supreme Federal Court.

Sahrawis living in the refugee camps on the other hand can get Algerian pass­ports to travel (but not Algerian citizen­ship) and can obtain birth certificates and national identity cards from the Polisario Front. However, as the SADR is not an inter­nationally recognised state, these docu­ments are not inter­nationally recognised either.

A significant part of the Sahrawi popu­lation now lives in Europe, particularly in Spain. Many came as children through the so-called «Vacaciones en Paz» program to spend a summer in Spain or later with the «Estudios en Paz» program, studying in Spain and living with Spanish families. Yet, these programs do not address the problem of a lack of docu­mentation. As the camps rely heavily on humani­tarian aid, labour migration is often the only way for Sahrawis to earn enough to support a family. As sociologist and anthro­pologist Marta Kluszczyńska from the University of Warsaw shows in an article from 2024, a lot of Sahrawis work, for example, on a seasonal basis in the tourism sector in the Balearic Islands. LEFRIG now leads a program in cooperation with the European Solidarity Corps, in which young women from the camps with no family members in Europe come to Zaragoza for a year to gain work experience. The young woman I saw in LEFRIG’s premises helping clients with the state­less­ness recognition procedure came to Spain through this program.

Dadah explains to me that a state­less­ness recognition proce­dure is now almost the only option for Sahrawis to be able to stay, whereas a few years ago it was possible to obtain Spanish citizen­ship by proving that one’s parents or grand­parents were born in Spanish Western Sahara. A state­less­ness recognition proce­dure is a specific adminis­trative or judicial process to determine if a person is stateless or not. Since state­less­ness may involve not possessing any inter­nationally recognised identity documents, such proce­dures are complicated. LEFRIG helps applicants with the paper­work and they have gained considerable experience with it. But the state­les­sness recognition process in Spain is intransparent, Dadah says. Spanish law, for example, does not state the standard of proof, which means that the authorities can ask for docu­ments that applicants may not be able to provide. There is a fixed time­line in law, but as Dadah tells me, the proce­dure can take from one to three years. He adds that he was shocked to learn at an inter­national conference on state­less­ness in Berlin that Spain’s proce­dure to recognise state­less­ness is actually good compared to the proce­dures in other countries. Although Spain does not recognise the state­hood of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, at least it recognises the state­less­ness of Sahrawis – some­thing that not many countries have done so far.

At the very end of our meeting, Dadah shares a bit of his own story with me. He did not have good support in his own state­less­ness recognition proce­dure, he says. He stopped because it would have taken too long for his dream of becoming a teacher in Spain to come true. Teaching in state schools in Spain requires Spanish citizen­ship. Without state­less­ness recognition, naturalisation remains out of reach. This demonstrates the extent to which educational and career opportunities are closed off without regular docu­mentation. Dadah’s only option was to be adopted by the Spanish family with whom he has been living since he had come to Spain with the «Vacaciones en Paz» program. This took only six months, while the intransparent waiting period of the state­less­ness recognition proce­dure seems to be indefinite.

After we’ve said goodbye, I walk through the sweltering alleys of Zaragoza, full of tourists. I think about how much is hidden behind dry, bureau­cratic processes and paper­work. How much joy there can be at the end of a process when the desired docu­ments are finally in hand, and how much hard­ship when state­less­ness is not recognised. And how little we value the docu­ments we have, because we don’t realise what becomes impossible when we don’t have them.

[1] In social sciences and humanities, the term «nationality» can carry problematic ethno­cultural connotations. In legal debates, however, «nationality» is the term used within inter­national law, while «citizenship» refers to the national (or even municipal) aspect of member­ship to a state.

[2] There are countless academic works on this, see e.g., Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016 or Robson 2020.

[3] This historical overview builds on a broad range of literature. Among others: Allan/Azrouk 2025, Bäschlin/Sideti 2011, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013, Hernández 2025.

Additional Information

More on LEFRIG and their projects (in Spanish): https://colectivolefrig.unizar.es/

Bio

Noemi Trucco is a sociologist, a SNSF Postdoc Mobility Fellow at the University of Luxembourg and an associated researcher at the Swiss Center for Islam and Society, University of Fribourg, Switzerland. Her work focuses on discourse and empirical subjectivation research, interpretive sociology, Muslims and Islam in Europe, processes of othering and exclusion and statelessness.

References

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  • Bäschlin, Elisabeth / Sidati, Mohamed (2011). Western Sahara – Territoriality, Border Conceptions and Border Realities. In: Wastl-Walter, Doris (ed.): The Ashgate Companion to Border Studies. Asghate, Aldershot UK: 549–565.
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